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In the oontroversy ooncerning animal
research, perhaps the following argunents
represent the extreme positions:

cipate in experiments. Certainly, in many
cases, they clearly indicate their willingness or reluctance to participate to anyone
willing to notice.

The pro-animal argument:
AI:
Animals cannot freely and with
understanding give or withhold oonsent to
participate in experiments.

Consider the case of Professor Barnes,
who wishes to determine whether nnnkeys can
canbine various things in their environment
to form a useful tool.
He puts sane bananas
inside a cage but far enough away fran the
bars so that the rocmkeys outside cannot reach
them.
He then puts several short sticks
which can be fitted together to form one long
stick outside the cage and watches to see
whether the rocmkeys, after realizing that
they cannot reach the bananas either with
just their arms or with just one stick, will
put the sticks together to form a stick long
enough to reach the bananas.
The IOOnkeys
native to the region have long since becane
accustaned to the research station, wander
into the cernpound each lOOrning in search of
food and entertainment, and, this lOOming,
are soon engaged in trying to get the banana.,
so alluringly out of reach inside the big
cage.

A2:
Experiments l1\3.y be performed only
on those who freely and with understanding
oonsent to participate in them.
A3:
Therefore,
performed on animals.

experiments may not be

The pro-researcher argument:
Rl:

Human life is a higher form of life

than animal life.

R2:
Experiments should be performed to
preserve and enhance the quality of life of
the higher life forms, even when this involves sacrificing the lives or quality of
life of lesser life forms.
R3: Therefore, experiments on animals to
preserve or enhance the quality of human life
should be performed.

Consider also the case of Professor
Jacobs,
who is
engaged in a series of
sleep deprivation experiments involving cats.
These experiments require that electrodes be
placed into the cats' brains, that the cats
be placed in a restraining apparatus, and
that they be hooked up to a roonitoring device
which delivers painful shocks to them whenever they start to fall asleep.
When Prof.
Jaoobs canes to the colony to get one of the
cats for an experiment, the cats all o:::Mer
and crawl into the far corners of their

Each of these arguments forms a tight little
syllogism of which even Aristotle oould be
proud. But are the premises reliable? That's
where the issue lies in this dispute.
We
shall question each in tUITl.

AI:
Animals cannot freely and with
standing give or withhold consent to
cipate in experiments.

underparti-

This \IIOuld probably be considered the
least oontroversial of the four claims I1\3.de
in these argunents.
Nonetheless, it is not
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cages.
When the professor opens one of the
cages, that cat hisses and strikes out at
him, which is why Prof. Jacobs has taken to
wearing long, protective gloves when handling
these cats.
Q1 the way to the laboratory,
the cats continually attempt to escape.

that "they don't know what's going to happen
to them"
or that
they
had entered
a
state
of psychotic depression.
Consequently, it makes sense to say that Prof.
Jacobs' cats, through their contrary behavior, are withholding consent to participate
in his research.

Do the I1xmkeys who try to get Professor
Barnes' bananas consent to participate in
that experiment?
Do the cats who try to
escape fran Professor Jacobs withhold consent?

What about Professor Barnes' rronkeys?
They are free to roam in and out of the
ccmpound, and we may also preSlIDle that they
have not been starved nor are otherwise desperate for food. So, they have not been c0erced into participating in the experiment.
Furtherrrore, the rronkeys understand what the
situation holds for them, namely, bananas, if
they can figure out how to get them, disappointment, i f they cannot. Prof. Barnes has
a rrore expansive understanding of the situation, including the contribution the experiment
could
make to "science" and
his
career, but these extra dimensions of the
situation do not affect the rronkeys' capacity
to act as sane, reasonably self-interested
agents in consenting to participate or not to
participate in the experiment.
As long as
the rronkeys are aware of what is happening to
them during the experiment and as long as
they are free to withdraw fran the experiment
whenever
they do not like what is happening
to them, it would be reasonable to say that
their participation in the experiment is an
expression of consent to participate.
This
interpretation is analogous to Soorates' oftrepeated claim that merely by living in a
free society we agree to the social contract.

It is clear in the second case that the
cats, by their behavior, indicate that they
desire not to participate in the sleep deprivation experiments.
Given the chance, they
would "vote with their feet" and leave the
good professor behind. But can this contrary
behavior be sensibly interpreted as the cats
withholding their consent to participate in
the experiments? Based on the standard requirements for informed consent when dealing
with human research subjects, we may be inclined to say "no." Since cats cannot understand the experiments in which they are to
participate, they cannot formulate informed
judgments to participate or not to participate in the research.
lbwever, that conclusion would overlook
the fact that understanding is not sanething
that exists by itself; it is always saneone's
understanding. So, when we say that the cats
do not understand the experiments, what we
mean is that they do not understand them iT.
the way Professor Jacobs does.
But while
that is doubtless true, it does not follow
that the cats do not understand the experiments at all or that they do not understand
them in the way required to give or withhold
consent.

Animals signing consent forms may be a
joke, but animals giving or withholding consent to participate in an experiment is not
absurd. Q1 the contrary, it is carm:m, easily reoognized, and often well-i.nformed and
reasonable, fran the animals' point of view,
which, where consent is the issue, is the
Viewpoint that counts. I t follows that A1 is
false. The problem with applying the consent
requirement to animal research is not that
the animals are incapable of giving or withholding consent.
The problem is merely that
researchers do not want to be frustrated by
animals refusing to participate in their
experiments.

It is clear that Professor Jacobs' cats
must understand the experiments in sane way;
otherwise, they would not be hissing and
attempting to escape.
Furtherrrore, even
anong humans, to be capable of g~V1l1g or
withholding consent does not require that one
understand the experiment in the way the
researcher does.
All that is required is
that one be sane and understand how the experiment will (likely) affect him/her. cats
seeking to escape fran the torments of sleep
deprivation research would seem to be expressing a sane, reasonable understanding of how
the experiments will affect them. Indeed, i f
the cats did not behave in this way in this
circumstance, we would be inclinffi to say

A2:
Experiments may be performed only on
those who freely and
with understanding
consent to participate in them.
Although
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still deeply resented by

many
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researchers, the requirerrent that people be
adequately infmne:i and freely a:rnsent before
becaning research subjects has becane a standard part of the ethics governing research
with human subjects.
'!bere are bo.u reasons
for this requirement.

guardian does what he/she believes his/her
ward would want or what would be in the
ward • s best interest, such cu'!pz"anises of the
principle of self-determination are not only
morally acceptable but necessary to provide
the individual the help needed to attain or
return to the condition where he/she can take
control of his/her own life.

(be is the many horrible experiments
that "scientists" have inflicted on defenceless or unwitting research subjects.
Not
only Nazi experiments but also experiments
perfonned in this country an prisoners, the
retarded or mentally ill, racial minorities,
and the poor have outraged the PJblic and
shown the need to protect people against
callous,
unscrupulous,
and
overzealous
researchers.

It follows that A2 is not an accurate
statement of current research ethics ooncerning human subjects. Non-consenting individuals may be research subjects, i f they are
tmable to recognize and evaluate the benefits
(for them) to be attained fran the research
-and i f they have a guardian who decides that
participating in the research will be in
their best interest (or will, at least, cause
them no hann).

'!be other reason for the oonsent requiremellt is our belief that individuals
should, as far as possible, be free to direct
their lives acoording to their own values.
People' s lives should not be oontrolled by
others who think "they know best," since what
looks the best to them may not be the best
for saneone who has different values.
For
example, to a physician camti. tted to preserving life at all costs, remaining alive on a
dialysis machine may "obviously" be the best
thing for saneone suffering fran kidney failure. But the persan actually having to live
such a life may not find it of sufficient
quality to be worth the trouble.
The oldfashioned "doctor knows best" paternalism
would have left the decision to the doctor.
Our new respect for self-determination has
fostered the requirement of consent to counter-balance paternalism and to insure that we
all have the opportunity to pursue our lives
according to our own values (provided we
acoord others the same freedan).

Just as this exemption opens the door
for therapeutic research an humans without
their oonsent, so it would leave open the
door for therapeutic research on animals.
'Ibis is the way things ought to be.
Recall
that the reason for insisting on infonned
oonsent is to protect individuals against
abuse. It would be an abuse of that ooncern
to make of the oonsent requirerrent an unbending principle which prevents those incapable of assessing the possible lang-range
benefits (for themselves) of a procedure fran
benefitting fran research.
It follows that
A2 would not (other things being equal) be a
desirable moral reform of our current research codes , either.
While
our oonclusion must be
that
neither of the premises of the pro-animal
argument is oorrect and, oonsequently, that
the argument is unsound, we may note that
honoring the reasons why Al and A2 are incorrect
would p..1t an end to virtually all animal research.
Animals who rebel against
research are virtually never resisting scmething that is for their own long-term benefit.
Usually, what they fear and seek to
escape is all the experiment and the future
hold for them, namely, illIprisorooont, pain,
torment, and death.
No sane, ccrnprehending
individual would agree to participate in most
animal research, and no responsible guardian
would agree to allow his/her ward to participate in that research.
So, acknowledging
that animals can give or withhold a:rnsent to
participate in an experiment and. that their
withholding a:rnsent can be overridden for
their own good would perm.i t only animal research which is pleasant for, innocuous to,

Hopefully,
the informed consent requirerrent is working to reduce the number of
research abuses of human subjects.
However,
it does not prevent doing research with human
subjects who have not consented to participate in the research.
If a person has a
legal guardian, that guardian may consent for
his/her ward to participate. 'Ibis can happen
when a person is judged to have lost oontact
with reality, as in mental illness, to be
tmable to make a decision, as when one is in
a cana, to be tmable to weigh the lcng-range
benefits, as with children, or when the individual does not yet have his/her own values,
as with infants.
In such cases,
"paternalism" is not a dirty word.
As lcng as the
BRlWEEN THE SPECIES
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exploit others are for that very reason justified in doing so. I f that~what is being
argued, the pro-researcher argt1IreIlt is an
instance of the "might makes right" fbiloSOPly--hardly a IlX)rally canpelling p:Jsition.

or beneficial for the animals themselves.

Rl:

Human

life

is a higher foun of

life

than animal life.

'!here is another,
lI'Ore credible interpretation of the lI'Oral relevance of intellectual superiority:
a rroral agent is sUpp:Jsed
to be one who acts out of respect for impersonal laws, and it requires reason to recognize such laws,
counter-balance
selfish
feelings, and do the rrorally right thing.
However, while this Kantian view of the rroral
significance of reason is superior to the
previous, Machiavellian account, it is clearly exaggerated. Kant's claim that acting out
of a sense of duty is the only rroral rrotive
is mistaken.
Loving parents are rrorally
estimable; indeed, they are rrorally rrore
estimable than "dutiful parents," a Iilrase
which usually damns with faint praise.
An
adequate IlX)ral theory ITUlSt (at least) make
roan for rroral sentiments alongside rroral
reasoning.

No foun of life is intrinsically higher
lower than any other--that is a logical

or
truism.
Sanething can be higher or rrore
valuable or rrore wortl.y or superior to sanething else cnly when measured against some
starrlard.
What is the starrlard here, and
what should it be?
'!he usual standard is intellectual abi lity.
For whatever Freudian reasons, the
ability to employ reason to control one's
life and surrot.mdings has traditionally been
=nsidered
r;onsidered the rrark of human superiority.
IOOeed, it has even been called the image of
God, the Creator and controller of the universe, in humans.
But while it seems true enough that
humans are, ordinarily, rrore intellectual
than other animals, it is not at all clear
that this is a rrorally significant dif-

But once we open this door for sentiment
to enter the rroral arena, it is not at all
obvious that instinctual and
conditioned
actions which are intentional and sincere
resp:Jnses to the needs of others should not
count as rroral actions and those who do them
as rroral agents.
For example, are we to say
that a rrother bird who feigns a broken wing
and risks her life to distract a fox fran her
nest is not worthy of rroral acclaim because
she acts on maternal instinct, rather than by
judging her maxim to be one she could will as
a tmiversal law?
What about a human rrother
who instinctively rushes into a burning house
to save her baby; ITUlSt she subscribe to the
categorical imperative in order to merit
rroral acclaim?
Of course not. Whether bird
or human, being a devoted rrother is a rroral
virtue, and this is an evaluation based on
the IlX)ther's self-sacrificing aommitment to
her child, rather than on her capacity for
abstract reasoning.
'!hus, we cannot so blithely dismiss
loyal dogs, courageous lions, self-sacrificing p:rrents of a wide variety of species,
rronogarrous wolves, resourceful beavers, and
the like as not being rroral agents because
they are "merely creatures of instinct."
Seeing virtue in other animals is not anthrop:rrorphizing, unless we preS1.llre that they do
their virtuous deeds as a result of the same
intellectual process we have to employ when

ference.
Especially when we view this issue
in tenns of the analogy to God the Creator,
it seems to follow that what we are talking
about is our ability to daninate and control.
Citing that ability as our rrorally crucial
superiority to other animals suggests that
the pro-researcher argumant
argtlIOOnt rests on the
claim that those who are strong enough to
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our social instincts fail us and we have to
canbat our lesser, selfish selves. However,
just as there is no reason to suppose other
animals go through this process, so there is
no rroral need for making such a presumption.
What makes an action an expression of rroral
agency is not that the agent had to put
his/her internal house in order in order to
overcome temptation and do what is right.
For an action to be an expression of rroral
agency, all that is required is that it be
done intentionally and sincerely in response
to what the agent perceives to be the need of
another.
The actions of rrany animals appear
to be such expressions.

regarded as superior pleasures by (sane of)
us does not show that they are superior to
the pleasures of other animals.
John Stuart Mill, the great champion of
qualitative differences arrong pleasures and
pains, acknowledges that the only way to
determine which are the superior pleasures is
to find scrneone who can appreciate the lot
and ask him/her which ones he/she prefers.
That is impossible here; for even Jclm Stuart
cannot know the pleasures of the gull and the
dolphin.
Consequently, as befits such a
determinedly egalitarian and evidenced rroral
pulosoj:i:ly, utilitarianism must reject this
effete basis for saying that one sentient
life form is superior to another.

'Ihe belief that we are rroral agents and
other animals are not is likely just an expression of our awn species prejudice, and
rationalistic rooral pulosopues are merely
attempts to rationalize that prejudice.
If
we are \TOrally superior to other animals, it
JID..lSt be a question of degree, and given our
particularly bloody, destructive, exploitative habits and history, that question must,
at best,
be considered open.
Given our
species prejudice, we may even question whether we are capable of sufficient impartiality to attempt an unbiased answer to. that
question.

other utilitarians of a rrore Benthamite
stripe, such as Peter Singer, claim that
hurnans are capable of a greater arrount of
pleasure and pain than other animals because
we are capable of projecting the future and
remembering the past to a vastly greater
degree than other animals.
'!his ability
makes it possible for us to experience the
pleasures and pains of such feelings as hope
and regret, feelings those of lesser temporal
capacity cannot experience •• However, even if
this is true, it may also be true that the
present pleasures and pains of other animals
are roore intense than ours because they are
not diluted by thoughts of the past or
future.
If that is the case, the extra intensi ty of their pleasures and pains might
rrore than outweigh the extra pleasures and
pains our extensive temporal capacity provides us. Of course, once again, there is no
way of telling whether the pleasures and
pains of other animals are rrore intense than
our awn and, if so, whether that greater
intensity is sufficient to outweigh
the
greater extent of our pleasures and pains.
Thus, this Benthamite version of human superiority encounters the same sort of problem
as the Millian version and must suffer the
same fate.

'Ihe other traditional standard of rroral
superiority of relevance here is the ability
to feel various pleasures and pains.
It has
been claimed. that humans are capable of
feeling pleasures and pains of a greater
variety and subtlety than other animals, and
that since the fundamental goal of rrorality
is to maximize the excess of pleasure over
pain in the world, we are justified in sacrificing less sensitive beings in order to
benefit the rrore sensitive.
Of course, we might respond that we
could equally well increase the excess of
pleasure over pain by sacrificing
those
beings who are rrore sensitive to pain in
order to benefit the less sensitive, but we
will not be so impertinent. Instead, we will
simply ask if it is so clear that humans are
\TOre sensitive to pleasure and pain than
other animals.
Can we enjoy the life of a
dog, a bird, a bat, or a porpoise~ can we
appreciate the subtleties of smell, sight,
sound, and touch which these animals can
apparently appreciate?
Perhaps they cannot
appreciate Michelangelo and l-bzart (an insensitivity, let us not forget, not limited to
members of other species), but that these are
BEIWEEN '!HE SPEX:IES

'!here could, of course, be an eOOless
line of suggestions for the standard which
shows that humans are superior to other forms
of life, but we shall stop with these two.
'Illey are the rrorally relevant standards, and
wi th these two the issue is open and must
remain open, since there appears to be no
non-arbitrary way of telling which species is
the roost rroral or sensitive. It follows that
when interpreted in a \TOrally relevant way,
Rl cannot be justified.
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R2:
Experiments should be performed to
preserve and enhance the quality of life of
the higher life fonns, even when this
involves sacrificing the lives or quality of
life of lesser life fonns.

(ii) experiments conducted on those who
already suffer frem the malady in question,

(iii) experiments which are cxxnpensated
with a reward of happiness for the research
subjects which IOOre than outweighs the sacrifice involved in the experiment, and

For the purposes of argument, let us
preSl.llre to be true what we just determined
there is not good reason to believe, i.e.,
that humans are IOOrally superior beings.
If
what makes us a IOOrally superior life form is
our ability to set aside self-interest and
rrake an impartial, disinterested appraisal of
what ought to be done, then it is a cruel
irony to cite this as justification for our
disregarding the interests of inferior ani mals and exploiting them as mere means to our
own ends.
Our (supposedly) greater ability
to act impartially does not provide ~ basis
for our acting selfishly in ~ dealings with
those of (supposedly) lesser IOOral ability.
Indeed, to the extent that we exploit those
less fortunate
than
our- selves,
we
-bring
into disrep.1te our claim to IOOral
superiority.
Doing experiments on other
animals which we would not be willing
to
do on ourselves is a clear example of such
discrediting
exploitation.
Consequently,
Kantianism does not support R2.

(iv)
experiments which require iIrlividual sacrifices as the only kncMn way for
attaining clear and present,
significant
group benefits.

--

The utilitarian concern in research, as
elsewhere, is to maximize benefit and minimize suffering and to do so without prejudice, i.e., without favoring the interests of
one group over those of another group in
balancing the pleasures against the pains.
Consequently, the principle of utility does
not reccmnend that we structure our experiments so that "lower" orders are sacrificed
for the benefit of "higher" orders.
Rather,
it <nmJaIlds us to structure experiments in a
way which will involve the greatest benefit
and the least suffering altogether.

Restricting research in these ways would hold
out the prospect of alleviating suffering in
ways which do not create additional misery or
loss, unless they are necessary for and outweighed by sane clear and present good. This
is what utilitarians, and, I should think,
all IOOral people, IlU.lst prefer.

This imperative poses a serious IOOral
obstacle
to
current
animal
research
procedures, since they involve sacrificing
tens of millions of healthy animals.
This
sacrifice involves adding greatly to the
annunt of suffering in the world and, finally, when these animals are killed, eliminates
the possibility of tens of millions of happy
lives fran the positive side of the utilitarian ledger.
Intuitively, the precept
which would best meet the utilitarian concern
is that research should be restricted to:
(i)
suffering,

experiments

which do

not

Thus, if we approach the issue frem
ei ther a Kantian or a utili tarial1 perspective,
designing experiments to sacrifice
supposedly lower life fonns in order to benefit supposedly higher life forms, i.e., ourselves,
is IOOrally disrep.1table.
Experiments IlU.lSt be justified on the grounds that
they are fair to all concerned and that they
are likely to make the world a happier place,
and these justifications provide no grounds
for our securing our own happiness by des-

cause
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continued from page 9

troying the happiness of others. Thus, R2 is
at odds with both of our primary IlX)ral concerns, justice and happiness. Consequently,
nei ther premise of the pro-researcher argument is morally justified.

an end in itself,

although when Kant,

alas,

approved an ethic forbidding utilization of a
sentient creature as an object rather than as
declared that ''man can have no duty to any
beings except hwnan," what we knCM of both
Voltaire and Rousseau suggests very strongly
that at that point they would have parted
<Xmpany with this all too hwnanistic philoso];i1er and, like Schopenhauer, have found that
proposition "revolting and abaninable."

Conclusion
The pro-aniJnal argument, which would
prohibit all research with animals, is unsound, but so is the pro-researcher argument,
which would penni t any experiment on animals
which might benefit humms.
The reasons
against these arguments suggest the following
positive conclusions:

EDITIOOS Q)NSULTED
(i ) Fundarnentally, there should be just
one set of moral principles concerning research, rather than one set for experiments
on hwnans and another, weaker set for experiments on non-humms.

Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of
Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).
Tan

(ii)
Experimental sacrifices must be
limited to situations in which there is a
clear and present opportunity for making the
world a happier place and ImlSt be roade according to principles which insure that the
sacrifices are borne fairly by all those
likely to benefit fran the experiment.
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